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According to the Institute of Medicine, ―Clinical practice guidelines are statements 
that include recommendations intended to optimize patient care that are informed 
by a systematic review of evidence and an assessment of the benefits and harms of 
alternative care options.‖ (Graham et al. 2011, p.4; see note 6.) As an example, the 
National Guideline Clearinghouse guideline NGC-8118 addresses the ―diagnosis 
and treatment of chest pain and acute coronary syndrome‖ (see 
www.guideline.gov).  
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Guidelines hold promise for cutting 
wasteful defensiveness, but practical 
feasibility limits their reach. Their 
importance could grow if changes in 
payment rules or responsibilities 
changed provider or patient thinking 
about the desirability of additional 
procedures. 
Introduction 
Health care costs too much in the 
United States. One problem is 
overservice driven by physicians‘ fear 
of lawsuit for failure to use all 
available modalities to diagnose or 
treat a patient. Reliable clinical 
guidelines promise to help by 
authoritatively stating standards of 
good care in advance. They also have 
political appeal as a compromise 
malpractice reform. Democratic 
notables including President Barack 
Obama have endorsed the concept, a 
number of physician groups are 
receptive, and some thought leaders 
promote the idea. Better standards can 
also promote accountability.  
Can such guidelines serve as liability 
safe harbors for caregivers who 
practice at the optimal level, 
protecting them from the risk of being 
second-guessed in a courtroom years 
later for not doing more? And will 
that protection reduce defensiveness 
and overutilization? The short 
answers: Following a good guideline 
should provide some liability 
protection, to an extent that will likely 
increase with time. But creating safe 
harbors will be difficult, and in 
practice, no harbor can be totally safe. 
Moreover, guidelines are not a silver 
bullet for defensiveness, but rather an 
addition to the policy armamentarium 
available to address overutilization.  
Over time, greater understanding of 
available medical options and their 
relative merits will probably help curb 
overutilization, especially if joined to 
other controls or incentives. Improved 
appreciation for how added services 
add medical risks and other costs 
should help modify today‘s 
expectations that more care is almost 
always better than less. In turn, such 
developments could alter how future 
judges and juries will react to 
conflicting expert evidence and how 
they will see the desirability of 
signaling caregivers to leave no stone 
unturned in caring for patients. If so, 
guidelines will have much larger 
impact in the decades to come. 
Why Are Clinical 
Guidelines Attractive as a 
Policy Reform? 
Federal policy has for some years 
encouraged comparative effectiveness 
research and guidelines development.
1
 
The 2010 health reform law also relies 
on preventive guidelines from an 
independent Task Force to define the 
preventive benefits that insurers must 
pay in full.
2
 A confluence of 
developments has boosted interest in 
guidelines: They promise a rare 
trifecta—better medical quality, more 
cost restraint through limits on 
liability‘s influence over medicine, 
and a potential avenue for political 
compromise on malpractice reform. A 
win-win-win. 
Improving quality: A long line of 
research has found substantial gaps 
between the care that patients should 
get and what is actually provided
3—a 
quality ―chasm,‖ according to the 
Institute of Medicine (IOM).
4
 Too 
often, patients get too much care 
(providing unnecessarily sophisticated 
radiology), too little care (forgetting 
an appropriate diagnostic test), or the 
wrong care (prescribing too high a 
drug dosage).
5
 Guidelines could 
improve matters by reliably indicating 
what works best for each type of 
patient in each set of circumstances. 
Two 2011 IOM panels explained how 
to develop trustworthy guidelines by 
 
What are Clinical Practice Guidelines? 
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There is a broad policy consensus that evidence-based guidelines should play a more prominent role in guiding medical decisions, 
as evidenced by the two recent IOM panels.
1
 However, David M. Eddy, MD, PhD, and other thought leaders have raised concerns 
that guidelines applicable to populations offer only a first approximation of individually appropriate care.
2
 The increasing ability 
and willingness to measure genetic biomarkers,
3
 to recognize differences in patients‘ behavior and their values and preferences, and 
to make more precise diagnosis and treatment decisions for individuals, supported by electronic health records and ―risk 
calculators‖—all these developments raise questions about the long-term value of population-based guidelines for individual 
treatment decisions, no matter how accurate as general conclusions. 
Dr. Eddy‘s ―Archimedes‖ model postulates both quality and cost improvements from shifting from population to individualized 
guidelines.
4
 A move toward individualized guidelines would undermine the rationale for deference to population-based ones 
through safe harbors, substituting individual standards of appropriateness that could deter overservice. Eddy‘s approach deserves 
serious attention, as he was a seminal promoter of evidence-based medicine.
5
 Yet any such paradigm shift remains uncertain and in 
any case will take time to occur, making it appropriate for this brief to focus on today‘s conventional, population-based guidelines. 
________________________________ 
1 Eden J, Levit L, Berg A et al (eds). Finding What Works in Health Care: Standards for Systematic Reviews. Washington, DC: National Academies Press, 2011; 
Graham R, Mancher M, Wolman DM et al (eds). Clinical Practice Guidelines We Can Trust: Committee on Standards for Developing Trustworthy Clinical Practice 
Guidelines. Washington, DC: National Academies Press, 2011. The reports were called for by the Medicare Improvements for Patients and Providers Act of 2008, 
Public Law 110-275, July 15, 2008. Additional translation and integration into decision support tools may be needed to make guideline effective, as noted in 
Avraham R. ―Private Regulation,‖ Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy, 34(2):543–638, 2009.  
2 Eddy DM, Adler A, Patterson B et al. ―Individualized Guidelines: The Potential for Increasing Quality and Reducing Costs.‖ Annals of Internal Medicine, 
154(9):627–634, 2011. 
3 Millenson ML. How Can We Move Clinical Genomics Beyond the Hype? Washington, DC: The Urban Institute, 2011, www.urban.org/publications/412426.html 
(accessed February 2012). 
4 Eddy DM et al (see note 2 above); Lumpkin JR. ―Archimedes: A Bold Step Into the Future.‖ Health Affairs, 26(2):w125–36, 2007; Archimedes, Inc. ―About 
Archimedes Inc.,‖ http://archimedesmodel.com/company (accessed February 2012). 
5 Eddy DM. ―Practice Policies: Where Do They Come From?‖ Journal of the American Medical Association, 263(9):1265–1275, 1990. 
 
operationalizing findings from 
―systematic reviews‖ of the most 
credible research on the comparative 
effectiveness of alternative clinical 
approaches.
6  
Containing costs, especially wasteful 
defensive medicine: Provision of 
inappropriate services not only 
reduces quality, but it also increases 
costs.
7
 A particularly inappropriate 
type of care is ―defensive 
medicine‖—extra tests and procedures 
done principally to forestall lawsuits 
or defend them if brought.
8
 Physicians 
perceive great liability exposure for 
omissions or delays if a bad outcome 
occurs, even if its likelihood was very 
small at the time of care and even if 
additional services would have added 
little or no clinical certainty.
9
 Such 
fears promote ―gold plating‖ of care—
adding services that may look good at 
the time to a worried patient or to a 
jury or judge in a courtroom years 
later, but that have little or no clinical 
utility. Practitioners have long 
reported such wasteful 
defensiveness.
10
 
Until recently, medical practitioners‘ 
strong belief that defensiveness 
greatly increases spending lacked 
strong empirical evidence,
11
 and very 
large dollar figures were asserted with 
very little documentation.
12
 Recent 
research finds that caps on awards and 
other ―tort reform‖ limits slightly 
lower medical spending—by about 1 
percent of health spending, much of 
which is taken to show reduced 
defensiveness
13—although findings of 
zero defensive spending also exist.
14
 
Side-stepping routinized political 
battles over malpractice reform: 
Republicans and Democrats have long 
battled for and against caps and other 
limits on litigation. If guidelines could 
effectively reduce malpractice fears, 
they would address the key 
Republican concern with defensive 
expenditures.
15
 This prospect 
encourages some Democrats to see 
safe harbors as a useful malpractice 
compromise,
16
 although no deal is in 
sight.
17
 
What Recent Proposals 
Would Use Guidelines to 
Reform Medical Liability? 
In June 2009 President Obama called 
for ―broader use of evidence-based 
guidelines‖ that could ―scale back the 
excessive defensive medicine 
reinforcing our current system of 
more treatment rather than better 
care.‖18 Other Democratic notables 
agree that doctors should get a ―safe 
harbor‖ against malpractice lawsuits 
when they follow established best 
practices.
19
 Some provider groups 
have also shown interest,
20
 and further 
support comes from opinion leaders 
and some researchers, with both 
conservative and liberal 
perspectives.
21
 
  
A Paradigm Shift for Guidelines? 
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There has been less activity on the 
federal legislative front,
22
 but the safe-
harbor concept has made it onto the 
short list of promising malpractice 
reforms that go beyond caps and other 
simple limits on traditional tort 
liability. For example, both bipartisan 
deficit reduction commissions of 2010 
supported safe harbors for adherence 
to guidelines, along with other 
reforms.
23
 
Moreover, the Obama administration 
has actively promoted 
experimentation with patient safety 
liability reforms. It funded the state of 
Oregon‘s guidelines and safe-harbor 
project.
24
 The president‘s fiscal year 
2012 budget sent to Congress in 
February 2011 proposed a new, larger 
round of grants for states to develop 
reforms, specifically focused on safe 
harbors and two other ideas supported 
by the deficit reduction 
commissions.
25
 (No state currently has 
operational safe harbors; they drew 
much interest in the late 1980s and 
early 1990s. Maine and three other 
states tried them to limited extents, 
after which they fell into disuse or 
were repudiated.
26
) 
How Can Guidelines 
Protect Providers? 
The safe-harbor idea is conceptually 
simple: If practitioners feel that 
liability exposure prevents them from 
practicing what they know to be good 
medicine and makes them instead 
overutilize low-value services, then 
good practice needs to be protected 
against lawsuits. Those who are not 
practicing good, evidence-based care 
need help and encouragement to do 
so.  
Following trustworthy guidelines 
should almost by definition improve 
medical quality and patient outcomes. 
And promulgated guidelines are 
immediately knowable, so that 
clinicians can rely upon the guidelines 
in caring for current patients.
27
 
Guidelines are already admissible in 
liability cases,
28
 to bolster one side‘s 
expert in-person testimony or the 
other‘s. But today‘s ―plethora of 
often-conflicting recommendations 
produced by multiple organizations‖29 
undercuts the persuasiveness of any 
one guideline, so results are still 
governed by unpredictable jury 
decisions that foster defensiveness.
30
  
Going forward, better evidence and 
more authoritative guidelines could 
justify making them safe harbors. 
Legislation would be necessary, as the 
hundreds of state appellate courts that 
create tort law cannot be expected to 
adopt such a new rule on their own, 
and certainly not uniformly.
31
 The 
statutes would need to specify the 
standards to be met for a guideline to 
qualify for safe-harbor status and also 
what legal effect that status would 
have in litigation.  
For example, the Healthy Americans 
Act proposed in 2009 by Senator Ron 
Wyden (D-Ore.) called for guidelines 
to serve as ―rebuttable presumptions‖ 
that care was not negligent.
32
 This 
means that a defendant could 
theoretically win without presenting 
any other evidence. Instead, the 
plaintiff would need to rebut the 
presumption with expert evidence of 
their own to convince a jury that 
medical services had been 
substandard (judges rule on who 
constitutes an expert).  
Such a presumption does little to 
increase the practical influence of 
guidelines in litigation. To proceed 
with a liability case, claimants must 
already have expert testimony that 
services were negligent, which a jury 
could believe over the presumption. In 
practice, defendants must therefore 
actively defend their conduct with 
their own experts. Defense experts are 
also needed to introduce guidelines as 
evidence, explain why they are 
authoritative, and show how they 
apply to the facts of the particular 
case. 
The word ―safe‖ in ―safe harbor‖ 
suggests stronger legislation, to make 
guidelines conclusive evidence of 
appropriate care. This would go 
farther than Maine‘s legislation or 
Senator Wyden‘s bill.33 If safe harbors 
created an irrebuttable presumption, 
plaintiffs simply could not contend 
that the guidelines are wrong and that 
a jury should instead believe a 
different standard articulated by an 
expert witness.  
Federal legislation in 1972 did 
something like this. It created 
Professional Standards Review 
Organizations (PSROs) as 
authoritative bodies to set standards 
for the appropriateness of care paid 
for by Medicare and protected 
physicians from later lawsuits for not 
doing more. The intended guidelines 
were denigrated as ―cookbook 
medicine‖ and were not promulgated, 
but the statutory authority remains for 
today‘s Quality Improvement 
Organizations, the successors to 
PSROs.
34
 
How Would Guidelines as 
Safe Harbors Prevent 
Defensive Medicine? 
The theory of safe harbors seems 
sound, as far as it goes. The need for 
better incentives to practice 
appropriately is certainly clear, as 
improvements from research can take 
a long time to diffuse into general 
practice.
35
 Moreover, medical 
professionals‘ vociferousness about 
defensive medicine suggests that legal 
incentives are strong enough to help 
motivate change. Safe-harbor rules 
hold promise for realigning legal 
incentives with good medical practice 
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and promoting fast uptake of proven 
modes of care. 
Guidelines could help reduce 
disputation not only at trial, but also 
well before. At the time of service, 
guidelines could help a caregiver 
explain to a patient why doing less is 
appropriate and incidentally could 
signal that the physician has accepted 
a form of accountability to 
independent authority and is not just 
cutting corners. Should patients 
nonetheless seek out lawyers to bring 
suit, an applicable guideline would 
help the attorneys screen out 
inappropriate cases—which they are 
well motivated to do. Even if a 
lawsuit is still filed, guidelines may 
shorten the uncertain and unpleasant 
period of ―discovery‖ during which all 
the lawyers in a case test out the 
strengths and weaknesses of their 
case—and that of their opponents. 
Guidelines are meant to constitute 
very strong evidence, even conclusive 
evidence, that guideline-compliant 
care is not negligent. They do not 
address what damages resulted from 
the injury, which are the focus of caps 
and similar tort reforms. Other 
reforms thus operate quite 
independently of guidelines, so 
guidelines could reform liability 
determinations with or without any 
reform to rules on payments. 
What Challenges Arise in 
Designing Safe-Harbor 
Protections? 
Maine‘s experiment with safe harbors 
revealed a number of practical 
challenges. The state‘s 1990 
legislation called on four specialty 
societies to create guidelines.
36
 
Development took about three years, 
and only a limited number were ever 
created. The promulgated guidelines 
were also often vague, with many 
exceptions.
37
 Leaving such flexibility 
for responsible clinicians was not 
unusual; it simply reflected the state 
of the art at the time, and the 1992 
IOM recommendations did the 
same.
38
 Finally, the promulgated 
statutory guidelines were not used in 
many legal disputes. By the end of the 
decade, the enabling legislation was 
repealed.
39
 Three other states that had 
shown lesser interest in trying out 
safe-harbor guidelines also ended 
their efforts.
40
 
Moving forward to 2012, guidelines 
development has made huge strides. 
What in 1992 was seen as simple 
review of key literature by one or 
more experts has become ―systemic 
reviewing,‖ nearly a discipline in its 
own right. The 2011 IOM panel on 
guidelines felt empowered by such 
advances to set much higher standards 
for guidelines development. 
Nonetheless, the panel ended its 
review of recent history by conceding 
that clinical practice guidelines still 
―suffer from shortcomings in the 
guideline development process, often 
compounding limitations inherent in 
their scientific evidentiary bases.‖41 
Supporters of individualized 
guidelines also highlight shortcomings 
in the population-oriented guidelines 
proposed as safe harbors.
42
 
In short, while guidelines‘ potential is 
great, much work remains before 
authoritative promulgation. Using 
guidelines as safe harbors will face 
challenges like the following: 
It may not be technically feasible to 
create enough relevant and reliable 
guidelines fast enough to change 
medical practice any time soon. This 
observation may seem surprising, as 
so many guidelines already exist. To 
repeat, however, most existing 
guidelines are not trustworthy, and 
more precision is needed to develop a 
safe harbor.
43
 Producing guidelines is 
also resource intensive and will 
become more so if IOM standards of 
trustworthiness are expected. One 
element of trust-building is securing 
support that is independent of 
potential conflicts of interest, yet 
much past effort has relied on interest 
group funding.  
Keeping guidelines up-to-date is a 
parallel challenge: The speed of 
medical innovation may outpace the 
capacities of existing researchers and 
guideline writers. Not only must many 
new guidelines be created, but all will 
need periodic review and potential 
revision, which intensifies funding 
challenges. 
Medicine has many gray areas not 
reachable by safe harbors: To be an 
effective safe harbor, a guideline must 
definitively indicate what care is to be 
given and what is not. However, 
statistical proof seldom creates a 
bright line between indicated and non-
indicated care. Consider prevention 
guidelines. Strong evidence may 
support the screening of women above 
age X for condition A, and also not 
screening those below age Y. 
However, between the ages of X and 
Y, evidence may well be weak and 
conflicting. Gray areas may be created 
not only by imprecise scientific 
knowledge, but also by differences of 
opinion about, for example, how to 
value increments of additional 
knowledge gained by ever more 
elaborate testing. Such issues of 
valuation go beyond the scope of this 
brief.
44
 
Popular or interest-group resistance 
to guidelines can be potent: Such 
objections may be able to derail 
guidelines at any stage—in the 
creation and promulgation of 
guidelines, even only advisory ones, 
in the enactment of legislation to 
make them safe harbors, or in 
guidelines interpretation by jurors. 
Many people simply do not agree with 
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IOM panels and authors of issue 
briefs that policy should be evidence-
driven and that good research 
constitutes a better basis for clinical 
decisions than personal experience, 
practitioner opinion, or popular 
anecdotes. 
One relevant example is that the 
federal Agency for Health Care Policy 
and Research was nearly defunded 
after it followed its legislative 
directive to create guidelines, some of 
which threatened the accustomed 
practices of politically potent medical 
specialists.
45
 The agency survived as 
the Agency for Healthcare Research 
and Quality, but stopped issuing 
guidelines.
46
 Another example is the 
more recent experience of the U.S. 
Preventive Services Task Force, 
which makes recommendations about 
what screening tests and other 
preventive modalities should routinely 
be used and paid in full by insurance. 
Two of the panel‘s guidelines 
provoked huge popular backlashes in 
2009 and again in 2011. First, 
accumulated evidence led the panel to 
cease recommending routine cancer-
screening mammography for women 
at younger ages, then, second, routine 
prostate cancer tests for men of any 
age.
47
 
Vociferous objections made national 
news, coming not merely from 
affected medical specialists and 
manufacturers but also from lay 
opinion leaders.
48
 Many opponents are 
convinced that the guidelines do not 
represent good science but are just 
trying to save money—unmollified by 
the contrary explanations of the task 
force or the lack of cost calculations 
in most underlying research.
49
 
Sometimes much simpler guidelines 
seem almost hardwired into belief 
structures: Prevention is always good, 
and more care is always better than 
less.
50
 
Should Safe-Harbor 
Guidelines be Enforceable 
Only as “Shields” to 
Disprove Negligence, and 
Never as “Swords” to 
Show Substandard Care? 
―Safe‖ implies that guidelines will 
fully protect against liability. A 
contentious issue is thus whether 
guidelines should put caregivers at 
new liability risk if they do not 
comply. Guidelines would clearly 
help plaintiffs attack under-serving by 
caregivers, in addition to over-
serving. Such use of guidelines as 
swords rather than shields angers 
many clinicians. However, existing 
guidelines are already used in both 
ways.
51
 Moreover, the logic of 
guidelines is that their safe-harbor 
status reflects their codification of 
best medical practice; and the logic of 
―best‖ is that less good can lie in more 
than one direction. Any defense-use-
only version of safe harbors also 
seems less likely to win legislative 
enactment, as it could no longer 
constitute a centrist political 
compromise. 
Even if barred from courtroom use, 
guidelines would still help plaintiffs‘ 
lawyers in other ways—for example, 
in finding expert witnesses to agree 
with the guidelines‘ 
recommendations. Similarly, 
attorneys and their experts‘ testimony 
can use a guideline‘s underlying 
systemic review to explain why care 
was negligent, without specific 
reference to any guideline. Once 
knowledge exists, its use can seldom 
be suppressed. 
An important caveat applies here: 
guidelines can inculpate as well as 
exculpate. That is their nature because 
they are developed to determine the 
right type and amount of service to 
provide under given circumstances. 
Such quality promotion is what has 
engendered so much policy 
enthusiasm, but another approach 
exists—guidelines that use research 
findings to determine what specific 
types or levels of care are excessive 
because they are unsupported by 
evidence—what some call setting 
boundary conditions. Thus, a 
guidelines developer could say that in 
a particular case there is no evidence 
that one procedure (e.g., an MRI) 
achieves better population results than 
another (e.g., ordinary X-ray followed 
by watchful waiting in certain cases). 
Similarly, a drug dosage of X might 
be known to be beneficial, but one of 
2X or higher could be detrimental. 
Thus, it may be necessary to 
emphasize the ceiling for appropriate 
care rather than the target of ideal care 
to create better safe harbors. 
What Hurdles Will Affect 
the Application of 
Guidelines as Safe Harbors 
in Practice? 
The targets of guidelines seem 
mismatched to the grounds of 
liability claims: Guidelines tell 
practitioners what plan of care they 
should choose, so they protect against 
claimed errors of planning, not of 
execution.
52
 The planning-execution 
distinction resembles the classic legal 
dichotomy between errors of omission 
(e.g., delayed diagnosis from failure 
to conduct an indicated test) and 
errors of commission (e.g., a scalpel 
slipped in surgery). Most 
commentators on defensive medicine 
see extra testing as a classic example 
of defensiveness, and safe harbors 
most readily deal with allegations that 
it was negligent to omit such tests. 
However, although data are not 
strong, malpractice claims generally 
allege errors of commission of many 
different kinds.
53
 So even if guidelines 
work precisely as intended where they 
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The plaintiff in this 1974 decision argued that the defendant ophthalmologist had been negligent in not giving her a simple eye 
pressure test for glaucoma until it was too late to prevent her tunnel vision. The guideline-like prevailing standard of care at the time 
was to routinely test people seeking corrective lenses only if they were at least 40 years old. That standard was based on research 
showing that glaucoma affected 2 to 3 percent of older patients but only one person in 25,000 at younger ages; and the plaintiff was 
only about 23 when she first sought corrective lenses in 1963. 
The trial judge instructed the jury that it must rule for the defendant if it found that there was such a medical standard, essentially 
making it a completely safe harbor.
2
 The jury complied, and the plaintiff lost at trial, then again on appeal. However, the state‘s 
Supreme Court reversed the lower courts, in a much-discussed ruling. 
One might think that the reason for not following the guideline absolutely would have been that the plaintiff had repeatedly returned 
seeking help for eye pain until the age of 32. This could easily have fit within a recognized exception to the general rule, which did 
―require pressure tests if the patient's complaints and symptoms reveal to the physician that glaucoma should be suspected.‖3 The 
state‘s Supreme Court instead went much further, ruling that the medical standard was irrelevant: Ordinary prudence alone required 
the provision of a safe, reliable, and inexpensive test where the condition tested for was so harmful. 
________________________________ 
1 83 Wash.2d 514, 519 P.2d 981, 67 A.L.R.3d 175 (1974, Supreme Court of Washington). 
2 The actual 1974 legal ruling overturned the traditional judicial rule that medical custom sets the standard of care. However, the practice on glaucoma testing was 
universal, effectively amounting to an authoritative guideline. 
3 Helling v. Carey (see note 1 above) Wash.2d at p. 516, P.2d, at p. 982. 
 
are applicable, the nature of safe 
harbors will leave many—likely 
most—lawsuits unaffected. 
Finally, even where a guideline seems 
directly applicable (e.g., indicating 
that the correct test or radiology was 
performed), a claim can often be made 
that the guideline‘s suggested care 
was incorrectly executed (e.g., that a 
test was not performed timely). 
Similarly, one could argue that 
although the indicated X-ray was 
done, the result was ambiguous and 
should have been reviewed by a more 
specialized practitioner or followed up 
with a more sophisticated test.  
There will always be battles over 
whether a particular patient’s case 
should have been an exception to the 
general guideline: Guidelines 
themselves have routinely contained 
exceptions to their general 
recommendations, notably for special 
subpopulations or people with 
particular medical histories. Even if 
no exceptions are stated, a litigant 
might try to convince a judge that one 
must have been intended or should be 
imposed, in the same way that 
litigants try to influence how 
regulations or statutes are interpreted 
in various cases. The following well-
known lawsuit provides a memorable 
example (see sidebar on Helling v. 
Carey).  
Any litigant can demand to be treated 
as an exemption to a guideline‘s 
general rule. Because each case is 
heard separately, judges or juries lack 
comparative context within which to 
weigh the appropriateness of such a 
claim.
54
 Similarly, the facts of what 
happened could be argued to differ 
from the circumstances specified in 
the guideline. 
How often claimants will be able to 
claim an exception from a seemingly 
applicable guideline is not certain. 
One can surmise that the likelihood 
will be higher where a guideline is 
more advisory than prescriptive, 
where it itself acknowledges that 
underlying research evidence is not 
worthy of the highest score, or where 
it is vague rather than specific, leaving 
much wiggle room for later 
interpretation. If the case for 
individualizing guidelines progresses 
in the literature and in esteem among 
expert witnesses, that development 
will further facilitate courts‘ allowing 
exceptions to general, population-
oriented safe harbors. 
Judicial rulings could also prevent 
effective application of safe harbor 
rules for litigation: Plaintiffs can 
litigate the validity of safe harbors, 
which are not of their own making, 
unlike safe harbors in other areas of 
law.
55
 Some courts might find safe 
harbors unconstitutional, just as caps 
on awards and other legislative limits 
on court-made tort doctrine have 
sometimes been invalidated.
56
 
Alternatively, judges might choose to 
interpret safe harbor legislation in a 
way that retains more traditional 
power for judges to control the law of 
tort.
57
 
Safe harbors cannot keep caregivers 
completely safe from having to 
appear in court: Although guidelines 
may discourage most suits and 
provide a solid defense to those 
Helling v. Carey1 
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brought, defendants may still have to 
go to court to assert that defense. Safe 
harbors cannot provide the complete 
immunity from suit in malpractice 
cases that they can elsewhere. For 
instance, the Office of Inspector 
General of the Department of Health 
and Human Services has absolutely 
guaranteed hospitals it will not 
challenge their subsidies of 
physicians‘ obstetrical malpractice 
insurance in underserved areas as 
illegitimate kickbacks.
58
 The 
enforcement agency has thus 
promised not even to begin 
proceedings. 
However, patients make no such 
promise about safe harbor guidelines; 
and any one of them can sue, and then 
hold out for a trial. There, defendants 
will have to prove, at a minimum, that 
the guideline is authoritative and that 
the facts of their case match its 
specifications. This prospect may not 
commonly occur, but it needs to be 
mentioned because medical 
practitioners so greatly detest 
appearing in court. 
How Much Could Safe-
Harbor Guidelines Reduce 
Medical Overspending? 
Research suggests that caps and other 
limits reduce medical spending by 
somewhat under 1 percent.
59
 
However, no good research shows just 
how various liability exposures 
translate into defensive actions. Yet 
policy analysis still needs to assess 
how well nonconventional reforms 
like safe harbors would work. As a 
start, the following observations seem 
relevant. 
Guidelines could somewhat reduce 
liability exposure and fear, but less 
than the strongest conventional 
limits: Caps and other limits are 
known and trusted by doctors—
whatever their policy merits—
whereas guidelines are novel and 
untrusted. Guidelines thus seem apt to 
have less influence than caps. 
Moreover, caps, limits on time to 
bring suit, and the like apply across 
the board, to all cases. In contrast, 
guidelines by definition target very 
specific circumstances, only a fraction 
of all claims. Caps are the strongest 
conventional reform, and although 
they might seem to apply only to a 
small subset of very large claims, 
behaviorally caps also affect smaller 
cases because they reduce plaintiff 
lawyers‘ negotiating leverage. With 
caps, they can no longer credibly 
threaten to win very large awards at 
trial. There is no such spillover impact 
beyond the specific targets of 
guidelines. 
Caps not only lower liability 
premiums, as all proponents note, but 
they also provide another extremely 
valuable but little-appreciated benefit: 
Caps greatly reduce the probability 
that even a single award could exceed 
the limits of a doctor‘s liability 
coverage and put the doctor into 
bankruptcy.
60
 That is a very powerful 
threat, and guidelines provide much 
less thoroughgoing protection. 
Defensiveness is partly engendered 
by generalized fears, and hence may 
be little affected by specific 
guidelines: Some amount of 
defensiveness seems to derive from 
vague fears about the unpredictability, 
and power, of an ever-evolving U.S. 
tort system. Substantial 
unpredictability and occasional 
sudden change is inherent in a system 
of personal-injury rules created by 
judges and administered by juries 
listening to idiosyncratically chosen 
experts. Where even one case may 
have career-ending potential, some 
defensiveness seems independent of 
the specific tort regime and frequency 
of litigation where a caregiver 
practices.  
One suggestive indicator of this 
phenomenon is that the level of legal 
fear reported by surveyed physicians 
tends to be similar across states, in 
large part independent of their varying 
legal climates.
61
 Certainly, the popular 
medical press and specialist liability 
newsletters rapidly give national 
dissemination to any single state‘s 
unfavorable results, raising fears in 
jurisdictions wholly untouched by the 
actual law (favorable legal rulings 
seem less newsworthy). One often 
hears of a Connecticut case while 
interviewing an informant in 
Colorado, for example.
62
 Safe harbors 
would not address such generalized 
fears, only identified types of low-
value services. Full insulation from 
liability would require comprehensive 
reform that replaces it with a new and 
different system of dispute resolution 
and compensation—a topic beyond 
the scope of this brief. 
Even without defensiveness, other 
strong pressures encourage 
overservice: Defensiveness is not the 
single root cause of overutilization. 
Other influences come from medical 
practitioners, patients, and social 
culture, including the fear of bad 
publicity, professional perfectionism, 
and peer pressure.
63
 Consumer 
demand can lead to overservice, if 
only for reassurance. Fee-for-service 
insurance payment, at favorable 
prices, is an important enabling factor 
for both providers and patients.
64
 
Liability interacts with such other 
influences. Sometimes consumers 
pressure physicians for extra care that 
professionals consider excessive. For 
such patients, an implicit threat to sue 
is a useful ―club‖ for getting what 
they want. Other times, physicians 
prescribe care that patients do not 
value. For such clinicians, liability 
 Timely Analysis of Immediate Health Policy Issues  8 
may constitute a convenient 
rationalization to provide the care, 
assuming that insurance payment 
makes the service free for the 
uninterested patient. Conjoined with 
all of these influences is a general 
societal belief that more is better—
held not just by doctors, but also by 
patients, judges, and jurors. These 
multiple causes of overutilization 
suggest that liability reforms would be 
most useful if conjoined with other 
reforms that target overservice. 
Concluding Discussion 
Defensive overutilization is a real 
problem, and guidelines as legal safe 
harbors appear to offer a partial 
solution. Beyond their face validity as 
a liability fix lie a number of problems 
for safe harbors. Not all care is 
amenable to the creation of 
guidelines, and there are practical 
limits on how many guidelines can be 
created and how quickly. 
Implementing guidelines as a safe-
harbor legal defense also faces 
challenges. Consequently, legislated 
safe harbors are unlikely to contribute 
much in the near term to bending the 
curve of increasing medical spending. 
By their nature, the quality-promoting 
guidelines now in vogue mainly 
provide guidance on what typically 
constitutes the best care for an entire 
population. Accordingly, they seem 
most suited to applications where they 
can be applied in an aggregate 
fashion. For example, it seems 
relatively easy to use guidelines as 
benchmarks for reducing payment to 
practitioners whose usage of 
diagnostic imaging far exceeds the 
applicable guideline. It is much harder 
to use a guideline to deny care to a 
particular patient, who can always 
argue that their case is an exception to 
the general rule. Malpractice cases 
always focus on an individual—a Ms. 
Helling and all her particulars—not on 
a general population in the fashion of 
systematic research reviews and 
guidelines. Moreover, if the emerging 
paradigm that guidelines should be 
replaced with individualized advice 
takes hold, its rationale may also 
encourage assertions that a particular 
case should be seen as an exception to 
a general guideline. 
To better reduce defensiveness by 
defending against assertions that not 
enough was done, guidelines may 
well need to set ceilings of 
reasonableness beyond which care is 
clearly inappropriate, not targets for 
all care to meet. This appears to be a 
less common goal of scientific 
guideline production, and if done 
would by definition apply only to a 
subset of cases. 
Safe harbors also seem most likely to 
be useful as adjuncts to other 
interventions that target 
overutilization, whether driven by 
consumer education or incentives, 
provider risk-sharing, health plan 
controls, or government directives. 
Then the legal protection simply 
makes compliance with the other 
effort more likely. The safe harbor 
does not have to carry the full load of 
changing behavior by itself. A 
utilization ceiling for payment, plus 
legal protection, was the approach 
taken by 1972 PSRO legislation for 
Medicare, a tactic worth another 
look.
65
 In any case, no single silver 
bullet can cure defensive 
overutilization because the tendency 
to gold-plate care is driven by many 
factors. 
Finally, to succeed in reducing 
defensiveness and overutilization, 
guidelines need to win popular 
support. Invocation of scientific 
authority alone will likely fall short, 
both in doctors‘ offices and in 
courtrooms. This seems clear from the 
recent firestorms of consumer protest 
over guidelines for mammography 
screening and prostate cancer tests. 
People can be told to apply guidelines 
but find a way around them if they 
lack popular legitimacy or seem to cut 
corners. 
Conversely, better informed and 
motivated patients might more often 
seek out evidence-based guides on 
their own. Then, popular media could 
have a larger role to play than legal 
reform. Newsweek‘s teaching readers 
when to say ―no‖ to more medicine66 
may reach more patients and jurors 
than safe-harbor legislation. Over 
time, more general use of 
scientifically valid guidelines, 
especially as ceilings, may alter the 
more-is-always-better bias of many 
Americans, whether caregivers, 
patients, or jurors. Then, guidelines 
will naturally move into the 
courtroom, as a familiar and accepted 
influence on standards of care. Such 
evolution lacks the quick-fix appeal of 
legislation, but seems likely to be 
more influential and sustainable.  
Regardless of the fate of guidelines as 
safe harbors, it remains important to 
press forward with generating good, 
evidence-based advice for clinicians 
and patients. Over time, it will 
become increasingly important for 
cost to be included in the evidence 
base as well. Then guidelines could 
protect against stinting as well as 
overutilization.  
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